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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the Master of Laws (LLM) in 
Transnational and European Commercial law, Banking Law, Arbitration/Mediation at 
the International Hellenic University.  
It introduces the changes brought about by the MiFID II/MiFIR legislative 
regime which aims to create a more efficient, transparent and integrated Financial 
Market that will bring the EU closer to its goal regarding the Single European Market, a 
target which inspires the writer to elaborate on firstly the path to be followed until its 
adoption, referring to the ISD, the subsequent adoption of the FSAP and the 
Lamfalussy legislative process, and on how they contribute to the adoption of the 
MiFID I; secondly on the MiFID I, which was the first complete legal regime to pursue 
the above goal and lay the foundations for the MiFID II/MiFIR; and third on the MiFID 
II/MiFIR legislative regime which is a creation/outcome of the technological 
development and the financial crisis of 2008, analyzing the key changes that were 
introduced on the market structure and transparency, on the level of investor 
protection, on how it adapted to the technological developments and on the 
strengthening of the supervisory authorities’ powers, finally quoting hers (the writer`s) 
thoughts & suggestions on the MiFID’s II/MiFIR’s development & on its current effect. 
At this point, I would like to thank my supervisor Professor Thomas 
Papadopoulos, a truly charismatic and inspirational professor, whose advice was 
valuable for completing my work and with whom it would be an honor to cooperate in 
the future. 
I would also like to thank my fellow students, already friends, for a remarkable 
cooperation and of course my University for its contribution throughout my studies.  
Last but not least, I am also very grateful to my friends, brother and parents, for 
the strength and encouragement they offered throughout my entire effort and for 
constantly supporting me towards achieving my goals. 
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Preface 
In order to navigate within the concept of the Financial System, namely in one 
market of it, the Capital Market, where investments in financial instruments are taking 
place, and where there is a constant desire to harmonize the rules on the provision of 
investment services in order to achieve the protection of investors throughout the 
whole investment process, but also to maintain the stability and orderly functioning of 
the market, it is crucial to get to know and understand the function of the Financial 
System and why it is so important that it remains stable, organized and subjected to 
rules.1 In a well-established Financial System, all participants should co-exist 
harmoniously so that the market fulfills its function, which is the distribution of capital 
into profitable investments and the assignment of the risk of these investments to 
those who can bear it.2 Therefore and in order to fulfill this without jeopardizing the 
orderly operation of the market, unsettling investor protection and market 
competition or adversely affecting third parties, the adopted rules should serve the 
enhancing of market stability and competitiveness, prevent systemic risk and 
strengthen investor protection, having market efficiency and integration as the 
ultimate goal.3 Only in this way will social and economic prosperity be achieved, which 
is a primary objective of a sound Financial System, which is an essential public good.4 
Therefore regulatory intervention should lie with the competent authorities without 
being a product of the market itself, as there is always a risk in the case of self-
regulation that financial interests override the proper functioning of the market 
towards the detriment of investors.5 So, in the context of globalization, the unification 
of the adopted rules is pressing more and more to facilitate cross-border trading, 
which results in profits but also risks for those who are not well established so as to set 
                                                 
1 Christos Gkortsos, Introduction to International Financial Law – The International Banking Law within the System 
of International Financial Law (Nomiki Bibliothiki, 2011), p. 58 
2 Chlistalla, Michael and Schweickert, Uwe and Wittner, Roland, Markets in Financial Instruments Directive - The 
Way Forward in European Securities Market Integration? (2006), p. 4, Available at SSRN 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=964492>, accessed 8 February 2019 
3 Ibid, pp. 4-5 
4 Sol Picciotto, Regulating Global Corporate Capitalism (Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 288 
5 Iain G Macneil, An Introduction To The Law On Financial investment (Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2005), p. 45 
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forward safe investments. So, in order to promote this cross-border trading, an entire 
multi-participant system is created, which undertakes to serve the investor by bringing 
him/her in contact with the holders of the financial instruments he/she wants to invest 
on. 
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I. Introduction 
Since the establishment of the European Union (EU), its primary objective, also 
reflected in the EU business regime, has been the creation of a Single and Integrated 
Pan-European Capital Market, which forms part of the Single European Market.6 To 
achieve this, an indispensable condition was the unrestricted and free movement of 
capital and services, two of the four fundamental principles enshrined in the Treaty 
establishing the European Community.7 For this reason, since the 1960s, there has 
been a tendency of the EU to remove all regulatory barriers that existed until then and 
to create legislation that would promote a developed and economically strong 
Securities Market, which would facilitate the rise of capital across the EU and the 
provision of investment services and trading of financial products cross-border.8        
 In this dissertation, the way the EU has followed towards this integration will 
be presented, from the initial Investment Services Directive (ISD), to the adoption of 
the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP), which reflects the EU's general policy 
towards a single financial services market and regarding the new Lamfalussy legislative 
process, which has helped the regulators move smoothly from theory to practice. 
Next, the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID I), a creation of the FSAP 
and the Lamfalussy approach, and its key points, accompanied by observations on the 
new market landscape, will be presented. This is a prerequisite for developing the 
central theme of this dissertation, the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
(MiFID II) and the Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (MiFIR), which are an 
upgrading of MiFID I, with basically the same legal justification but adapted to the 
shortcomings that emerged during the implementation of the first, mainly due to the 
2008 financial crisis, but also to the rapid technological advancements, which call for 
the according legal provisions. MiFID II/MIFIR, which aimed at greater transparency of 
transactions, strengthening investor protection and the role of supervisors, is 
                                                 
6 Iain G Macneil, An Introduction to The Law On Financial investment (Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2005), p. 45 
7 European Union, Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community, OJ C 325/2002, art. 49 and 56 respectively 
8 Nathalie Aubry and Michael McKee, MiFID: where did it come from, where is it taking us? (2007) 22 (4) Journal of 
International Banking Law and Regulation, pp. 1-2 
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presented as the medicine for the sick market. Then, some of the critical changes 
brought about by MiFID II/MiFIR, as selected by the writer, will be thoroughly and 
meticulously analyzed. Finally, the impact of the new regulatory regime on the market 
will be determined in its relatively short period of implementation, and some thoughts 
and suggestions will be given, in the writer's opinion, in order to conclude on whether 
MiFID II/MiFIR was finally worth daring and facing the risk. In closing, it must be 
emphasized that the dissertation does not intend to present the provisions of the 
legislation from a technical point of view as this would be impossible due to its huge 
volume, but to focus on the spirit of the legislation.
  -5- 
II. Towards the Single Market for investment services and activities 
Having the above as a guide, one of the very first attempts of the EU to reach 
an integrated Securities Market was in 1993, through the adoption of the ISD. Briefly, 
the three main innovations that the ISD brought were (a) the introduction of the 
concept of a ‘European passport’, with which an investment firm was able to access 
the market of others European Member States once it was authorised in one of them, 
being in this way able to operate and provide its services without becoming a subject 
to local approval by each Member State, since it was supervised by the domestic 
competent authorities,9 (b) the ability of cross-border trading on an electronic basis for 
the regulated markets and (c) the adoption of common ‘conduct of business’ rules for 
investment firms,10 creating cross-border, non-discriminatory and equitable 
competition between credit institutions and investment firms.11 However, the 
shortcomings of the ISD, as it ceased to produce economic advantages and its 
contribution to integration was not satisfactory, became quickly perceptible and the 
necessity to adapt to the new structure of the market imperative.12   
 The decision to revise ISD has coincided with significant decisions on the future 
of the European Capital Market. The adherence to national interests and the 
protection of the national Securities Markets, the refusal of market participants to 
engage in a constructive dialogue, and the lack of understanding of modern Financial 
Markets, have been dealt with through a joint project, so that the to be revised and 
adopted rules really reflect a new era for the EU.13 The year of 1999 is a milestone and 
the adoption of the FSAP came to disrupt the peace of the European Capital Market. 
This plan consisted of a series of legislative measures taken to eliminate legislative and 
                                                 
9 Ryan J. Davies, MiFID and a Changing Competitive Landscape (2008), p. 3, Available at SSRN 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=1117232>, accessed 8 February 2019 
10 Nathalie Aubry and Michael McKee, MiFID: where did it come from, where is it taking us? (2007) 22 (4) Journal of 
International Banking Law and Regulation, p. 2 
11 Emilios Avgouleas, EC Securities Regulation, A Single Regime for an Integrated Securities Market: Harmonized We 
Stand, Harmonized We Fail? (2007) vol. 22 Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation, Part 1 & Part 2, p. 2 
12 Niamh Moloney, EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation (3rd edn, Oxford EU Law Library, 2014), p. 330  
13 Emilios Avgouleas, A Critical Evaluation of the New EC Financial-Market Regulation: Peaks, Troughs, and the Road 
Ahead, (2005) 18 Transnat’l Law, p. 181 
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regulatory gaps and remove obstacles14 to the achievement of the two primary 
objectives of the FSAP, i.e. the integration of the Financial Market by harmonizing 
national rules, targeting a mutual recognition of national systems and activities 
throughout the EU and the regulation of the integrated market in general.15 In order 
for the FSAP to be strengthened and its implementation more quickly achieved and in 
a successful manner as well, it was combined with the upgrading and improvement of 
the legislative process, by adopting the four-level approach, proposed by the 
Committee of Wise Men, under the chairmanship of Professor Lamfalussy, which was 
assigned to provide its opinion and recommendation on the issue.16 This legislative 
process, known as the ‘Lamfalussy approach’ consists of: 
• the first level, where a piece of legislation is adopted, in which the basic rules 
and principles are defined,  
• the second level, where a detailed and technical clarification of the first level 
rules follows, in the form of implementing measures,  
• the third level, where the regulatory authorities cooperate to ensure the 
prudent and continuous implementation of these standards and 
• finally, the fourth level, under which the European Commission (EC) monitors 
the compliance of Member States with the EU legislation17.  
In the case of the above procedure, there were doubts as to whether the 
competent law-making bodies were indeed defenders of the interests of the market 
players in each Member State,18 which does not seem, anyway, to be the case, judging 
                                                 
14 Peter Walker, Observations on the MiFID (2006) vol.1, no. 3 Irish Business Law Quarterly, p. 1 
15 Niamh Moloney, Large-Scale Reform of Investor Protection Regulation: The European Union Experience (2007) 4 
Macquarie Journal of Business Law, p. 148 
16 Christian De Visscher, Olivier Maiscocq and Frederic Varone, The Lamfalussy Reform in the EU Securities Markets: 
Fiduciary Relationships, Policy Effectiveness and Balance of Power (2008) 28 Journal of Public Policy, p. 20 
17 Ibid, pp. 22-23 
18 Ibid, p. 39 
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by its extensive use in other areas too, such as banking and insurance,19 thus 
concluding that it has indeed fulfilled its objective and has been effective and 
supportive of the market integration. Thanks to the FSAP and the new law-making 
process, the Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 
April 2004 on markets in financial instruments, known as MiFID I, was born, considered 
by many to be the ‘constitutional law’ of the European Union in the financial services 
market,20 the main points of which I will present below, in the second chapter of this 
paper, as it will help understand the importance of the current legislative framework 
which arose after the MiFID’s I revision. 
 
                                                 
19 Emilios Avgouleas, EC Securities Regulation, A Single Regime for an Integrated Securities Market: Harmonized We 
Stand, Harmonized We Fail? (2007) vol. 22 Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation, Part 1 & Part 2, p. 2 
20 Chlistalla, Michael and Schweickert, Uwe and Wittner, Roland, Markets in Financial Instruments Directive - The 
Way Forward in European Securities Market Integration? (2006), p. 1, Available at SSRN 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=964492>, accessed 8 February 2019 
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II. A brief look at MiFID I 
1. Introduction 
MiFID I, which was applied by all members of the European Economic Area 
(EEA) since 30 April 2004 and has been implemented on the 1st of November 2007, 
replaced the earlier ISD and aimed to provide common and harmonized rules for the 
provision of investment services and activities across the EU. According to Recital 71 of 
MiFID I, its objective was the efficient operation of the European Financial System, 
which presupposes integrated financial markets that favour investor’s protection 
according to common regulatory standards. As we can see, the basic principles on 
which it relied on are not far from those of its predecessor but in addition go a step 
further, by seeking the supra-national integration of the Securities Markets’,21 as I 
believe that even if a State is shaping a strong and efficient internal market, opening 
up its activities and operating outside can only be achieved if there is the necessary 
legislation that functions in a supportive way and creates a level playing field for all 
Member States. After all, competition is a driving force for development and economic 
growth. 
To achieve its objective, the changes that MiFID Ι brought to the trading 
landscape of the EU were major, affecting many players of the Financial Market, 
mainly the investment firms and credit institutions, which had to adapt to the new 
rules. As far as its scope is concerned, it has expanded, covering new investment 
services and activities that would have the privileges granted by the ‘European 
passport’,22 the concept of which has just been simplified and has expanded. It 
introduced as an investment service the operation of the Multilateral Trading Facilities 
and the provision of investment advice,23 and covered the commodity and derivatives 
transactions, too.24 To the above, as well as to the key changes that will be examined 
below, the technological revolution coupled with the increased cross-border trading 
                                                 
21 Ibid, p. 3 
22 Michel Tison, Financial Market Integration in the Post-Fsap Era (2006), p. 6, Available at SSRN 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=901565>, accessed 8 February 2019 
23 MiFID I, ANNEX I, Section A 
24 MiFID I, ANNEX I, Section C 
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and the appearance of alternative trading venues, the inadequate harmonisation of 
the ISD at national level and the lack of cooperation between the competent 
authorities, which is necessary for compliance with and enforcement of the rules, 
contributed in particular.25  
Subsequently, the key changes introduced by MiFID I will be presented and 
divided into three categories, which are the ones that have experienced the greatest 
reforms, i.e. the reforms on the market structure, on the investor protection regime 
and on the transparency rules. After this, I will discuss the impact of MiFID I on 
Financial Markets and the main reasons that led to its later reform. 
2. Market Structure  
Regarding the structure of the market, MiFID I imposed a new classification of 
trading services, aiming to increase competition, which was limited until then. These 
are the Regulated Markets (RMs), the Multilateral Trading Facilities (MTFs) and the 
Systematic Internalisers (SIs).26 The term ‘Regulated markets’ was already known from 
the ISD and corresponds to the traditional stock exchanges, but the other two 
categories are put under the regulatory microscope for the first time. MTF is defined as 
‘a multilateral system, operated by an investment firm or a market operator, which 
brings together multiple third‑party buying and selling interests in financial 
instruments – in the system and in accordance with non‑discretionary rules – in a way 
that results in a contract’27 and an investment firm offering bilateral trading, so-called 
SI, was defined as ‘an investment firm which, on an organized, frequent and systematic 
basis, deals on its own account by executing client orders outside a regulated market 
or an MTF’.28  
In this way, the concentration rule that has been in force so far, namely trading 
orders to be executed only through the stock exchanges is abolished and the 
                                                 
25 Emilios Avgouleas, EC Securities Regulation, A Single Regime for an Integrated Securities Market: Harmonized We 
Stand, Harmonized We Fail? (2007) vol. 22 Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation, Part 1 & Part 2, p. 4 
26 Peter Gomber, Michael Chlistalla, MiFID - Catalyst for a new trading landscape in Europe? (2008), p. 1, Available 
at SSRN <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1134763>, accessed 8 February 2019 
27 MiFID I, art. 4, par. 1, (15) 
28 MiFID I, art. 4, par. 1, (7) 
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competition for order flow grows considerably among the new market players.29 The 
acceptance of the MTFs as an investment service, which demonstrates the recognition 
of their benefits30 and the ability of investment firms to internalize trades as SIs31 has 
been driving forces to increase competition and liquidity.32 However, there were also 
voices claiming that, under this regime, there was a risk of reducing the efficiency of 
the price formation process and that the liquidity would be fragmented, resulting in an 
increase in trading costs rather than in their desired reduction.33 However, in my view, 
the entry of new players into the market, was a positive development as it offered new 
business opportunities, especially in the market of market data, where so far RMs have 
been dominated34 and which had to redefine their position within the market to 
preserve their acquis, and last but not least, investors had more options for where to 
execute their orders, hence more likely to find the most appropriate investment 
service for them.  
 
3. Investor Protection 
Investor protection is one of the most significant aims of MiFID I, as stated in 
Recital 31 and for this reason, the relationship between investor and investment firms 
is regulated by a set of rules, from its beginning to its end, covering all provided 
investment services.35 MiFID’s I major changes concern the ‘conduct of business’ 
regime, as reflected in articles 19-22 of MiFID I. Article 19 establishes an obligation for 
                                                 
29 Ryan J. Davies, MiFID and a Changing Competitive Landscape (2008), p. 2, Available at SSRN 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=1117232>, accessed 8 February 2019 
30 Christoph Kumpan, Carrot and Stick - The EU's Response to New Securities Trading Systems (2006) vol. 3, no. 4 
European Company and Financial Law Review, p. 401 
31 Jean-Pierre Casey, Karel Lannoo, The Mifid Revolution: A Policy View (2006) vol. 7, no. 4 Competition and 
Regulation in Network Industries, p. 522  
32 Athanasios Panagopoulos, Ioannis Dokas, Thomas Chatzigagios, The Main Effects of MiFID on European Capital 
Markets and European Integration (2015) vol. 6, no. 5 International Journal of Business Administration, p. 53 
33 Peter Gomber, Michael Chlistalla, MiFID - Catalyst for a new trading landscape in Europe? (2008), pp. 21-22, 
Available at SSRN <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1134763>, accessed 8 February 2019 
34 Jean-Pierre Casey, Karel Lannoo, The Mifid Revolution: A Policy View (2006) vol. 7, no. 4 Competition and 
Regulation in Network Industries, p. 527 
35 Niamh Moloney, Large-Scale Reform of Investor Protection Regulation: The European Union Experience (2007) 4 
Macquarie Journal of Business Law, p. 147 
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investment firms to act fairly towards investors, in accordance with the rules of 
marketing and the assessment of suitability or appropriateness, the obligation of 
‘knowing your client’ with increased disclosure and reporting requirements as well,36 
which should be detailed and in a comprehensible form. Subsequently, article 21 
establishes the best execution obligation, whereby investment firms should take ‘all 
reasonable measures’ to obtain ‘the best possible result’ for their clients, taking into 
account many parameters such as the price, cost, speed, probability of execution and 
settlement as well as the size and nature of execution, imposing at the same time on 
them the requirement to establish and implement an order execution policy. Finally, 
under article 22, investment firms have the duty to manage their clients' orders in such 
a way that they ensure their ‘prompt, fair and expeditious’ execution, in order to avoid 
conflicts of interest in relation to other client orders or even their own interests. These 
obligations, in order to be properly fulfilled, ought to be in line with the nature of each 
investor and the category to which they belong, that is ‘professional’, ‘retail’ and 
‘eligible counterparties’, which are however not binding, since under certain criteria 
and conditions investors may apply for their ‘registration’ in another category.37 
Some comments on the above are necessary. Initially, the purpose of the 
Directive is to protect investors systematically38 and to strengthen their confidence in 
the Securities Markets. Indeed, investors' confidence, that the market is stable, can 
promote sustainable growth as they can entrust their capital to the market and deliver 
liquidity to it.39 In this ‘new’ market, investors will have a voice and choice. Investment 
firms, which should operate in the interest of the investor, play also a significant role 
towards this. Moreover, the investor's informed choice is an important point within 
the new regime, but that is not enough.40 This means that he/she should have the 
                                                 
36 Niamh Moloney, How to Protect Investors: Lessons from the EC and the UK (Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 
209 
37 Kiran Karande, MiFID Best Execution Benchmark (2007), p. 7, Available at SSRN 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=982952>, accessed 8 February 2019 
38 Kwangwook Lee, Investor Protection in European Union: Post FSAP Directives and MiFID (2009), p. 3, Available at 
SSRN <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1339305>, accessed 8 February 2019 
39 Ibid, p. 19 
40 Niamh Moloney, Large-Scale Reform of Investor Protection Regulation: The European Union Experience (2007) 4 
Macquarie Journal of Business Law, p. 147 
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necessary education, so that he/she can evaluate and use the provided information 
properly.41 All the above has been taken into account by the EU, which for the first 
time sets its target on retail investors and markets, seeking to strengthen them 
through its policy decisions.42 This is simply justified by the fact that retail investors 
have less knowledge and experience than professionals. However, some drawbacks 
have also been observed, which mainly involve the best execution regime. Although it 
is up to each investment firm to formulate its own policy, thereby increasing 
competition and lowering costs for investors, however, the lack of clarity as to what is 
‘best execution’ creates risk for investors thus restricting the possibility for them to 
exercise their bargaining power against firms which act monopolistically within the 
market.43 
4. Market Transparency 
Transparency is a key element in creating a sound and high-quality system. 
High transparency can contribute to better pricing, as the investors have a clear 
picture of all trading venues, reducing transaction costs, enhancing market efficiency, 
creating informed investors, and eliminating information asymmetries.44 As regards 
the transparency rules, introduced by MiFID I, they have proved to be one of the most 
controversial issues, namely those concerning pre-trade transparency. As developed 
above, new trading venues have been set up, that will have to comply with the 
transparency rules. Regarding RMs and MTFs, which have a quite similar function, they 
are subject to the same pre- and post-trade transparency obligations. As for the pre-
trade transparency, they are obliged to ‘make public current bid and offer prices’45 and 
as regards post-trade transparency to publish ‘the price, volume and time’ of 
                                                 
41 Niamh Moloney, How to Protect Investors: Lessons from the EC and the UK (Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 
375 
42 Niamh Moloney, Large-Scale Reform of Investor Protection Regulation: The European Union Experience (2007) 4 
Macquarie Journal of Business Law, p. 147 
43 Kwangwook Lee, Investor Protection in European Union: Post FSAP Directives and MiFID (2009), p. 17, Available 
at SSRN <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1339305>, accessed 8 February 2019 
44 Christoph Kumpan, Carrot and Stick - The EU's Response to New Securities Trading Systems (2006) vol. 3, no. 4 
European Company and Financial Law Review, p. 394 
45 MiFID I, art.29, par. 1 and art. 44, par. 1 
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transactions carried out in their systems, but only in respect of shares that are 
admitted to trading on a RM.46 However, the main problem has arisen regarding the 
pre-trade transparency obligations imposed on SIs, for which a quite strict regime 
finally was applied.47 SIs were obliged ‘to publish a firm quote in those shares admitted 
to trading on a regulated market for which they are systematic internalisers and for 
which there is a liquid market’48 and only when they are dealing for sizes up to 
standard market size. This, however, exposes them to the risk of their competitors' 
strategy and development policy, since they must publish each offer although they 
trade on their own account.49  
To conclude, these provisions were very detailed and complex, which creates 
further difficulties, but undoubtedly transparency is crucial as it contributes to a better 
price formation and increases liquidity.50 It also creates new business opportunities as 
appropriate backup systems should be created for this whole amount of information.51 
The biggest short story, however, in my opinion, is that they only apply to equities, 
leaving other equally important markets outside the regulatory framework, and so this 
fact either acts as an obstacle for those who want to invest in them but fear the 
unknown or interacts positively if they seek more ‘private’ transactions without leaking 
details regarding them. 
5. MiFID’s Impact and the need for its reform  
After three years of implementation, it was judged by the EC that in general the 
Directive was successful and introduced many and significant changes. It established 
the freedom of financial intermediaries to do business in all Member States, based on 
the authorization of the State in which they operated and increased the competition 
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between the trading venues, by eliminating the ‘concentration’ rule, the cost at the 
expense of investors decreased, as well as the time of their transactions, while the 
transparency, at least at the equity market improved.52 Investors had new trading 
opportunities across the EU, and similar business opportunities were held by other 
market participants, such as the providers of clearing services and of market data.53 
However, legislative loopholes have emerged, stemming not only from the 
2007 financial crisis, but also from the market developments and rapid technological 
evolution, with which legislation must go hand in hand. Indicatively, some of the dark 
points of the post-MiFID I era must be mentioned.  
Initially, the new challenges and benefits introduced by the Directive were not 
diverted to the final recipients, the investors.54 Additionally, the entry of the new 
trading venues brought competition but also led to market fragmentation, reducing 
part of its transparency due to the difficulty of collecting transaction data from them.55 
In addition, there was a strong need to create an upgraded post-trade transparency 
regime and to extend the transparency rules to cover other instruments, hence 
markets, too.56 Significant changes have also been made in the derivatives market, 
which has largely developed but remained under an incomplete and turbulent 
regulatory framework.57 In addition, the financial crisis has affected the way in which 
many financial instruments are negotiated, and technological development has 
created new ones, more complex, which posed a threat even to the most well-
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informed investors.58 At the same time, technology has undermined and rendered 
unnecessary certain provisions and has highlighted the need to adjust them, covering, 
for example, electronic trading and high frequency trading (HFT), which should be 
immediately regulated and supervised.59 Finally, there was strong growth in Over-The-
Counter (OTC) trading, i.e. trading outside the regulated market, which operates 
without or with minimal regulatory framework, making it attractive not only for large 
transactions by professional investors, but also for small in volume transactions by 
retail investors.60  
In response to the above weaknesses that emerged, in December 2008, the EC 
published a consultation paper to comment on the MiFID I regime. The response from 
the market participants was enormous, while many counseling documents were also 
published by the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR).61 These were 
considered by the EC, which finally published on October the 20th of 2011, proposals 
for a Directive and a Regulation to replace MiFID I.62  
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III. The new regulatory regime: MiFID II and MiFIR 
1. Introduction  
The new legislative framework consists of the Directive 2014/65/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial 
instruments, and the Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments, known respectively as 
MiFID II and MiFIR. Their main difference is that the Directive, which amends the 
previous MiFID I, needs to be transposed into national legislation, while the 
Regulation, as defined in Article 288 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union ‘shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.’ It is 
therefore not subject to any condition in its application, reducing the risk of divergent 
interpretations by the Member States.63 MiFID II/MiFIR came into force on July/2/2014 
and was applied on January/3/2018˙ as far as the Directive is concerned it should be 
incorporated into national law by July/3/2017.64  
The revised legislative regime, which is again applied following the Lamfalussy 
process, consists of hundreds of pages, including delegated and implementing acts, it is 
highly technical and complex, and the financial actors will have to pay close attention 
to its application. The difficulty in collecting all the necessary data for a steady and 
smooth transition to this new revised era was one of the reasons why, at ESMA's 
request, the EC agreed, so as to avoid possible volatility and market disturbance, to 
delay the application of the legislative package for exactly one year.65  
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Firstly, regarding the scope of MiFID II, it is expanded by adding a new 
investment service and activity, the one of the Organized Trading Facility (OTF),66 
creating a new set of data reporting services67 and covering yet another category of 
financial instruments, emission allowances,68 but also structured deposits, although 
not a financial instrument.69 Both laws, which are creations of the technological 
progress and the financial crisis, which could be said to have been the element that 
formed them, are introducing key changes in the functioning of the financial sector, 
covering Securities Markets, investment intermediaries and trading venues, and 
affecting all participants within them.70 Each piece of legislation focuses on different 
points. As for MiFID II, it ensures that trading takes place on organized platforms, 
improves transparency on the equity and non-equity (especially derivatives) markets, 
improves the oversight of the financial market, strengthens investor protection, 
embodies ‘conduct of business’ requirements for all market participants, introduces 
rules on electronic trading and HFT and on the powers available to the competent 
authorities as well.71 Concerning MiFIR, it focuses mainly on transparency issues, such 
as the disclosure of data transactions to the market and to the competent supervisory 
and regulatory authorities, contains rules for mandatory trading of derivatives on 
organized platforms and grants additional supervisory powers about specific financial 
instruments and positions in derivatives to the competent authorities.72 
                                                 
66 MiFID II, ANNEX I, SECTION A 
67 MiFID II, ANNEX I, SECTION D 
68 MiFID II, ANNEX I, SECTION C 
69 MiFID II, Recital 39 
70 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 
2014/65/EU on markets in financial instruments as regards certain dates, Brussels, 10.2.2016, COM (2016) 56 final-
2016/0033(COD), Explanatory Memorandum, p. 1 
71 Nis Jul Clausen, Karsten Engsig Sørensen, Reforming the regulation of trading venues in the EU under the 
proposed (MiFID II) – levelling the playing field and overcoming market, Nordic & European Company Law Working 
Paper No. 10‐23, p. 4, Available at SSRN <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2021079>, accessed 8 February 2019 
72 Official website of European Commission, Available at <https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-
euro/banking-and-finance/financial-markets/securities-markets/investment-services-and-regulated-markets-
markets-financial-instruments-directive-MiFID_en#MiFID-2-and-MiFIR>, accessed 8 February 2019 
  -19- 
2. Key changes introduced by MiFID II and MiFIR 
The key changes brought about by the new legislation will next be analyzed. To 
achieve this, they have been divided into five categories, which in turn deal with issues 
relating to effective market structure, enhanced transparency, stronger investor 
protection, adaptation to technological developments and strengthening of the 
supervisory powers. These are the areas that have undergone most of the 
modifications, the grid of which I will try to present, so even the most inexperienced 
reader, to realize the importance of the new European legal framework for the 
markets for financial instruments. 
 
2.1. Market Structure 
The changes to the structure of the market reflect international initiatives as 
incorporated into the G20 reform agenda.73 The EU Reform Agenda, which follows 
these guidelines, aims to establish a ‘single rulebook’ for the Single European Market.74 
Regulatory reforms should therefore lead to European integration and economic 
growth.75 So, as we will discuss below, a set of requirements seeks to bring back 
trading in organized, open, and transparent trading venues, especially for shares and 
derivatives, and to reduce trading in OTC space.76 In support of these initiatives, 
another trading venue, which exclusively deals with the trading of non-equity financial 
products, was introduced, and finally, in order to boost capital movement, the SME 
Growth Market was created, which seeks to bring small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) back into a path of economic development. The structure of the market is 
inextricably linked to its performance, as the better the structure, the better the 
market performance, so it must be built with special care and attention. 
2.1.1. Trading Obligation for shares and derivatives 
The financial crisis has highlighted weaknesses in the securities and derivatives 
markets. The former became more complex and unpredictable in terms of financial 
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instruments and activities taking place within it, and the latter had grown too much, 
but lacked enough regulation and supervision, since for several years the reins 
remained in the hands of the financial industry.77 These phenomena posed a systemic 
risk to the financial market, which must be adequately addressed, while contributing 
to the development and strengthening of OTC trading, which should be limited.78 To 
deal with the above, the trading obligation for shares and derivatives was introduced, 
which aims to restore trading in organized venues and to fire competition among them 
in order to achieve better price formation and liquidity. Among many individuals, these 
obligations have been characterized as being another ‘concentration rule’, which goes 
much further than that introduced by the ISD.79 
Under article 23 of MiFIR, the wider market trend becomes apparent, as 
reflected in the legislative texts, to allocate shares trading within the formal and 
regulated markets and venues and to reduce the OTC market.80 Investment firms are 
obliged to ensure that trading of shares admitted to trading on a regulated market or 
traded on trading venues will take place on RMs, MTFs, SIs or an equivalent trading 
venue in a third country, unless they are subject to two exceptions, they are i.e. ‘non-
systematic, ad hoc, irregular and infrequent, or are carried out between eligible and/or 
professional counterparties and do not contribute to the discovery process’.81 At the 
same time, by addressing the extensive OTC trading, the positive results will be evident 
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both in the transparency of these transactions and in the quality of the price discovery 
process, ultimately increasing the liquidity of the market.82  
Furthermore, the trading obligation extends to derivatives as part of the new 
single EU rulebook on derivatives markets,83 as influenced and shaped by global 
initiatives in the Financial System. The G20 Summit held in Pittsburgh on 25 September 
2009 included in its agenda the need to strengthen the international financial 
regulatory system and to achieve this goal proposed the improving of the OTC 
derivatives markets,84 by transferring the trading of standardized OTC derivative 
contracts to electronic platforms or exchanges, wherever appropriate.85 In response to 
these proposals, the EMIR and MiFIR, which are interconnected and regulate the first 
the central clearing and the second the trading of derivatives on regulated markets 
and platforms, have been adopted.86 Now, under the new legislative regime and 
according to article 28 of MiFIR, derivatives falling under the EMIR Regulation and the 
central counterparty clearing requirements should be traded in organized venues such 
as RMs, MTFs and OTFs or in equivalent trading venues of third countries.87 Finally, the 
very establishment of the OTF, which will be discussed below has the ultimate aim of 
repatriating the trading of derivatives to formal and organized venues, in full harmony 
with the G20 agenda.88  
2.1.2. A new trading venue: The Organised Trading Facility 
Following the above, MiFID II introduces another trading venue named OTF, in 
response to the EU's efforts to reduce the OTC trading and to place the non-equity 
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instruments into an organized and well-regulated regime.89 The OTF ‘means a 
multilateral system which is not a regulated market or an MTF and in which multiple 
third-party buying and selling interests in bonds, structured finance products, emission 
allowances or derivatives are able to interact in the system in a way that results in a 
contract in accordance with Title II of this Directive’.90 But although the intention was 
to equalize the trading venues, having the same rules of transparency and similar 
organizational rules, however, between the RMs and MTFs on the one hand, and the 
OTFs on the other there is a fundamental difference. Beyond the financial instruments 
traded within OTFs, which are only non-equity instruments, the former offer non-
discretionary execution of orders and access into their system, while the latter are 
characterized by a discretionary element, controlling the entry and placement of 
financial instruments in their execution system as well as the order matching.91 This is 
due to the roots of the OTF, as it comes from bilateral trading, so it inherently acts 
with distinction,92 but it is not allowed to be combined with Systematic 
Internalisation93 nor is it permitted under article 20 of MiFID II to execute orders 
against its own proprietary capital. This is because the ability to operate discriminatory 
can create a conflict of interests between the investor and the operator of an OTF or in 
case of executing orders against their own capital it would impair the stability and 
liquidity of the OTF itself.94  
However, the paradox of the OTF is its dual nature, as it is an organized venue 
on which the same rules as RMs and MTFs are imposed, and on the other hand the 
OTF operator is an investment firm and is bound by pre- and post-trade transparency 
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obligations and ‘conduct of business’ rules.95 It is a hybrid as it is has been widely 
characterized, which raises doubts as to the accuracy of its operation and the 
information it provides.96 The OTF came to capture trading that does not take place in 
other venues, to be a regulated platform for non-equity instruments and derivatives, in 
response to the changing financial market landscape. However, the market was hostile 
to this change, mainly because it believed that regulators should focus on the existing 
trading venues, and because its entry would bring less flexibility to the market, leaving 
no space for OTC trading.97 Nevertheless, in my opinion, the OTF brings new 
challenges, rearranging forces within the market, widening the game and increasing 
the competitiveness of both the trading venues between themselves and of the 
European market across the financial world. 
2.1.3. SME Growth Market 
One of the most innovative modifications is the creation of the SME Growth 
Market, which will facilitate access to capital for SMEs. This change aims to improve 
the financing conditions for SMEs by providing alternative ways of funding, based on 
the available market capital and bringing the EU a step closer to the Single Market for 
financial services.98 The SMEs, which are at the heart of the EU economy, after the 
financial crisis have been in a precarious financial situation. They were trapped and 
unable to find resources especially through bank lending.99 To deal with this, under 
article 33 of MiFID II, the conditions to be fulfilled are provided for an MTF to be able 
to register as an SME Growth Market. The SME Growth Market is essentially a sub-
category of MTFs. However, the real opportunity created here, is the possibility of dual 
listing, which can bring both the integration of European financial markets and the 
facilitation of cross-border liquidity. More simply, article 33 par.7 allows an SME that 
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has been admitted to trading on an SME Growth Market to be listed in another same 
SME market, only if the issuer is aware of it and has no objections.100 This is only 
achieved if the above provisions are equally incorporated and sufficiently harmonized 
across all EU Member States, a process which is particularly problematic due to the 
strong differences and ways in which the Member States interpret them.101 This 
initiative, clearly positive, will help SMEs find financing through the Capital Market, 
bringing them their business growth as well and will help them overcome the barriers 
faced by issuers of financial instruments up to date, while maintaining at a high level 
the protection afforded to investors consistently, to make them re-trust the Capital 
Market.102 
2.2. Market Transparency  
Market transparency is one of the primary objectives of the current legislative 
framework, clearly demonstrated by the fact that the rules on transparency are 
included in the Regulation, which does not allow Member States to differentiate their 
approach.103 The new rules, more rigorous, detailed and extensive, fill the gaps that 
emerged during the financial crisis. As we will see below they aim to reduce 
transaction costs for the benefit of investors, increase market liquidity, improve the 
price formation process, strengthen the Financial System by limiting dark pools, and 
inform all market participants of the details of the executed transactions in order to 
strengthen everyone’s position within it and to improve market surveillance and 
supervision, avoiding potential market abuse. This is only done through common and 
harmonized rules, which MiFIR has largely achieved. 
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2.2.1. Pre-trade and post-trade transparency obligations 
According to the MiFIR provisions, the scope of pre- and post-trade 
transparency is widened. The same transparency requirements, which must be 
properly formulated, apply to all trading venues and to all financial instruments traded 
within them.104 Pre-trade transparency requirements for equity and non-equity 
instruments require, pursuant to articles 3 and 8 of MiFIR respectively, that investment 
firms or market operators make public the information regarding the price and the 
volume at which their members wish to trade, subject to certain waivers from the pre-
trade transparency regime, upon approval by the competent authorities, as set in 
articles 4 and 9 of MIFIR. On the other hand, as regards post-trade transparency under 
articles 6 and 10 of MiFIR, for equity and non-equity instruments respectively, firms 
are required to make public the information about the price and volume of the already 
executed transactions and disclose the details of these transactions as closer to real 
time as possible, subject to the possibility of granting deferred publication of specific 
types and sizes of transactions, upon approval by the competent authorities, as set out 
in articles 7 and 11 of MiFIR. In this respect, we note the key innovation that has been 
made in relation to MiFID I, as so far these requirements have only been met for 
shares and only for those admitted to trading on RMs.105 
As far as SIs is concerned, they are also subject to pre-trade transparency 
requirements according to articles 14 and 18 of MiFIR, for both equity and non-equity 
instruments and are required to make public quotes on these instruments traded on a 
trading venue for which they are SIs and for which there is a liquid market.106 In the 
case of equity instruments there is a general obligation to provide public firm quotes, 
and when the market is not liquid, these quotes are provided to their clients upon 
request.107 On the other hand, in the case of non-equity instruments, even if the 
market is liquid or not, they provide quotes only if so requested and agreed upon.108 
We therefore see that the concept of ‘liquid market’ is crucial. This is explained by the 
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fact that although the intention is to be functionally equivalent to trading venues, the 
risk the SIs undertake with the obligation to provide increased transparency, although 
traded against their own capital, should be limited.109 Thus, the liquidity condition and 
the rules set out were their means of protection.  
Of the above, some important conclusions emerge regarding the importance of 
transparency in the market. Pre-trade transparency is necessary because it will create 
a kind of coherence throughout the EU,110 it will contribute, through the information 
provided to investors, on the choice of the trading venue and the identification of the 
investment opportunities available.111 On the other hand, post-trade transparency 
improves market quality by making it more transparent,112 will enhance confidence in 
market prices,113 contribute to the implementation and enforcement of the best 
execution regime for investment firms, and finally enable the investors to check 
whether it was indeed the best possible execution of their order.114 Extending 
transparency to non-equity instruments, redefines the market itself, contributes to the 
evaluation of these new instruments and promotes an effective price formation 
process.115  
2.2.2. Transaction Reporting 
Market integrity and stability are inextricably linked to the obligation of 
transparency and reporting of all details of a transaction. For this reason, investment 
firms and the operator of a trading venue are required under article 26 of MiFIR to 
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provide the National Competent Authorities (NCAs) with all the details of a transaction 
until the closing of the next working day.116 This obligation applies to all instruments 
that have been admitted to trading or are already trading on a trading venue and to 
those that the underlying instrument is a financial instrument that falls within the 
above category or is an index or a basket made up of such financial instruments even if 
the transaction takes place outside the trading venue.117 The breadth of the 
information provided is increasing, and it must be possible to identify the clients for 
whom the transaction is made and the persons or algorithms processing the 
transaction.118 The above report may be made either by the investment firm itself, the 
trading venue or a third mechanism, being it an Approved Reporting Mechanism 
(ARM),119 which will have to be licensed for that purpose.120 
To achieve this, the relevant records with all the above data should be kept by 
the investment firms and operators of a trading venue for at least five years, as 
provided for in article 25 of the MiFIR, which are available to the competent 
authorities and ESMA, upon request. At the same time, under article 27 of MiFID II, a 
trading or execution venue is required to provide information to the public on an 
annual basis on the quality of transactions within its system, and an investment firm 
about where and how a client's order has been executed.121  
These reporting obligations are the monitoring tools of the market’s 
participants’ activity, in order to find out if they act professionally and in the interest of 
investors.122 Furthermore, they help to avoid a similar repetition of market abuse and 
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to suppress money laundering and terrorist financing.123 The question, however, is 
whether, in fact, this data can make sense and realistically be exploited by ESMA in 
order to act, when necessary.124 The doubt is understandable, but in any case, I believe 
that if a specific group is created, at national and European level, to process and 
evaluate the provided information, then yes, the use of all this information will make 
sense and the transparency, which is very important for the market financial services 
will bear fruit. 
2.2.3. Dark Pools 
According to surveys and market data, OTC trading and the increased 
appearance of dark pools affected liquidity, as no pre-trade information was 
provided.125 Indeed, two types of dark pools were observed, which were the waiver-
based one and related to equity instruments, mainly shares, and the OTC dark pool.126 
The first, due to the expanded waiver system of the previous regulatory regime, which 
allowed these markets to thrive,127 was relatively more transparent and better 
organized, while the second was totally dark, giving it an avant-garde profile.128 Dark 
pools were mainly driven by market fragmentation, caused by the entry of new trading 
services, which had an impact on its liquidity and reduced trading in organized 
venues.129 In order to address these problems, the new OTF which deals with non-
equity financial instruments was introduced, and the obligations of transparency and 
reporting of transactions were broadened, including other financial instruments than 
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shares traded in RMs.130 Further, the rules of the present regime stand out for their 
rigor, with regard to the possibility of providing pre-trade transparency waivers in case 
of equity instruments, aiming at combating dark pools directly, in conjunction with the 
introduction of the double volume cap mechanism (DVCM).131  
Article 4 of MiFIR lists four pre-trade transparency waivers for equity, which 
are: reference price, negotiated transactions, large in scale transactions and order 
management facilities. Further, article 5 of MiFIR imposes a DVCM for transactions 
occurring under the use of reference prices and negotiated transactions waivers. This 
mechanism aims at a better price formation and the maintenance of market 
liquidity132 by limiting the transactions in dark pools of a financial instrument traded in 
a trading venue to 4% and for the total EU trading in a financial instrument to 8% of 
the total volume of trading in that financial instrument on all trading venues across the 
Union over the previous 12 months. We are therefore observing that these 
arrangements do not attempt to eliminate dark trading but to constrain it, stabilize it 
and put it under control in order to attract more liquidity into the market and to 
restore the credibility of the price formation process.133  
2.2.4. Consolidated Tape Provider  
The above pre- and post-trade transparency obligations aimed at reducing dark 
pools and foster a more reliable price formation with the goal of enhancing market 
credibility and investor’s confidence in the market.134 This can only be achieved if all 
market participants have access to this kind of information. Thus, new organized 
entities have been introduced, known as data service providers, who must meet the 
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authorization conditions as defined in MiFID II provisions, which will collect and 
disclose to the competent authorities and to the public this data. The most important 
of these providers is the CTP,135 which collects information published by an Approved 
Publication Arrangement (APA)136 or a trading venue for all financial instruments, 
consolidates them into an electronic data system and communicates them to the 
market the closest to the real time of the transaction and on a reasonable commercial 
basis.137  
In this way the undesirable effects of the hitherto fragmented market will be 
reduced, the quality of the available data will be improved, as well as the access to it, 
investors will be able to compare the prices and volume of the traded financial 
instruments and make better investment decisions, while NCAs and ESMA will develop 
a stronger market surveillance practice.138 Data services providers also make a 
significant contribution to this by facilitating investment firms, as they themselves 
undertake compliance with reporting and transparency obligations, while saving extra 
time and money that investment firms would lose to respond to their obligations. It is 
remarkable that it was left to the market itself to create this CTP, so whether or not it 
will ultimately react is in direct relationship with whether it considers it a positive, 
negative or even complicated change to be able to manage it. 
2.3. Investor Protection 
 The structure of the financial market after the financial crisis has changed a 
lot. It is characterized by intense complexity and the presence of many participants, 
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who have developed new investment plans that better respond to the increased 
competition that globalization has brought.139 A typical example is that of banks, which 
have radically changed their business plan, offering not only simple banking but also 
investment products.140 Within this setting, the presence of investors and their activity 
is intense, hence the protection of their interests is of prime importance.141 The 
services and financial instruments offered to them, which are now more complex and 
the inability of even the most informed investors to assess the risk to which they are 
exposed, have led to the introduction of strict ‘code of conduct’ obligations for the 
investment firms and of entirely new obligations, covering the areas of manufacturing 
and distribution of financial products.142 We note therefore, that a total change of the 
existing rules does not occur, but instead they are adapted to current developments, 
creating a more stringent regulatory framework for market participants. 
2.3.1. Rules of Conduct 
The categories of investors under MiFID II/MiFIR are those of ‘retail’, 
‘professional’ and ‘eligible counterparties’. Depending on the category to which an 
investor belongs and on the type of the investment services provided to him/her,143 
the level of protection afforded towards him/her is formulated, as well the principles 
that must be firmly observed by investment firms.144 Before any reference to these 
rules of conduct is made, it should be stressed that regardless of the category to which 
an investor belongs, in which the regulatory measures must be adjusted each time, the 
provision of investment services must be fair, clear and not misleading for all of 
them145 and an investment firm should act honestly, fairly and professionally in 
accordance with the best interests of its clients’.146 In contrast to MiFID I, which did 
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not provide for this general obligation to be applicable to the eligible counterparties, 
on the ground that they are able to negotiate their standards of protection, now the 
protection of this category is strengthened, too.147 As far as the rules of conduct, they 
mainly concern the obligation of information, reporting and execution. According to 
article 24 of MiFID II, information provided to investors should be clear, fair and 
secure, not to create misunderstandings with investors, including that relating to 
communications which take place during the pre-contractual period. Subsequently, 
article 25 of MiFID II includes the obligation for investment firms to act in competence 
and knowledge, i.e. to assure the competent authorities that the natural persons 
responsible for providing investment advice and information meet the criteria of 
knowledge and suitability and that they are worthy of their position of responsibility 
they possess, and lays down the obligation to ‘know your client’. Under this obligation 
and for an investment firm to comply with it, the client must provide all information 
regarding his/her personal financial condition and his/her investment objectives so 
that the firm can make the right and appropriate investment on his/her behalf. Finally, 
article 27 of MiFID II introduces the obligation to execute orders on terms most 
favorable to the client, i.e. to ensure best execution of investor instructions. What is 
apparent from these provisions is that in general, the ‘conduct of business’ rules for 
investment firms does not change dramatically in comparison with those of MiFID I. It 
appears that the information obligation is again dominant and wider, and investment 
firms are obliged to provide more details for investors to make informed decisions.148 
At the same time, the amount of information is growing, which has risen doubts 
regarding how much of it can be exploited by the investor.149 However, in my view, the 
amount of information and the fear of their ruthless exploitation should not be taken 
into account, because the provision of less information will have negative implications 
for the level of investor protection. Additionally, as we have seen above, there should 
be adequate training for investors to invest successfully, otherwise investors with little 
capacity of understanding the products they are invited to invest on, will not be 
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protected. There are therefore a number of factors that need to be combined with 
precision to produce the desired result. 
2.3.2. Distinction between independent and non-independent advice 
One of the major changes in MiFID II is the separation between independent 
and non-independent advice and the obligation for investment services to inform 
clients of the type of the advice they provide.150 It was discovered that, in the context 
of the financial crisis, the quality of advice provided by investment firms suffered, as 
they were not obliged to explain and account for the advice they offered, resulting in 
poor trading quality and to the destruction of many investors.151 Thus, although the 
provision of personal recommendations to a client, at his request or at the initiative of 
the investment firm, was already established as an investment service in favor of 
investors seeking guidance in this complex Financial System,152 in the current 
regulatory framework, this obligation has gone a step further.  
An investment advice is offered on an independent basis, when an investment 
firm evaluates a sufficiently wide range of financial instruments available on the 
market which must be sufficiently different in terms of their type and issuers or 
product providers and is not limited to the financial instruments issued or provided by 
the firm itself or entities with which the firm has close links or legal or economic 
relations.153 Although this separation was introduced for the benefit of the investor 
and with the best intentions by the legislative bodies, there are also opposing voices. 
Some argue that it would be better to introduce some general prerequisites for any 
kind of advice which, anyway, should be of good quality.154 The supporters of this 
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position consider that there is a risk of this separation, that the interests between the 
adviser and the investor may collide and that the former’s will prevail over the latter’s 
and investors will be charged with unsuitable advice.155 However, they also 
acknowledge that this is quite difficult because of the general loyalty obligation of 
investment firms, with which view I totally agree, as the new framework is so rigorous, 
with many traps for investment firms, which leaves no room for tricks. 
 
2.3.3. Ban inducements in the case of independent advice and portfolio management 
Paying incentives, in the form of inducements to investment firms clearly 
affects the choice of products promoted to investors,156 creating fears that they will be 
affected by other interests rather than investors’.157 As a rule, inducements may not be 
accepted and maintained by an investment firm unless the quality of the services 
offered is increased and it does not conflict with its general obligation to act in the 
best interests of the investor.158 So, in avoidance of situations of conflict of interest 
between investment firms and investors, the provision of inducements was prohibited 
as reflected in the combination of articles 24 and 23 MiFID II.159 However, the 
regulatory landscape is now tighter and more rigid regarding services of independent 
advice and portfolio management. This means that an adviser or portfolio manager 
should not accept and retain inducements from a third party for the services he/she 
offers unless it is a small non-monetary benefit of such nature and size that it does not 
cause a conflict of interest.160 This benefit should also contribute to improving the 
quality of the service offered while at the same time the investor should be aware of 
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this kind of payment.161 The ban of inducements in the above two cases is aimed at 
enhancing investor protection, which will be achieved through absolute transparency 
of the imposed costs, but also requires new business plans for investment advisers and 
portfolio managers who will have to adapt to the new regime in fear of their 
disappearance if their operation was based solely on the payment of inducements.162 
 
2.3.4. Product Governance 
In the context of the general obligation on investment firms to inform 
investors, they should trace the target market and indicate to them the most 
appropriate financial products based on the client category they belong to.163 This is 
only possible if common harmonized rules are imposed on the firms that create and 
sell the financial products. In this way, the products will be built according to the needs 
and the profile of the investors and will be sold by those who understand them 
through appropriate sales strategies.164 Indeed, for the above reasons, obligations for 
manufacturers and distributors of financial products were introduced under the MiFID 
II.  
The rules applicable to manufacturers are extended throughout the life cycle of 
a financial product and their interaction with distributors, while those applicable to 
distributors are mainly concerned with assessing the suitability and appropriateness of 
these products with investor’s needs. Before the marketing or distribution of financial 
products, an approval process should be carried out, in which the possible target 
market will be identified at the discretion of the manufacturer, and the risks inherent 
in it. Then it should be ensured that product distribution strategy is compatible with 
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the target market.165 All this information and the characteristics of the financial 
products should then be made available to the distributors as well.166 Manufacturers 
should at this stage assure that the products meet the needs of investors as they 
appear in the target market as well as the needs of the target market itself, and that 
the products will indeed be distributed on that market.167 Finally, distributors need to 
understand the products offered or proposed, to assess their compatibility with the 
needs of investors and to identify the target market, based on its previous 
determination by the manufacturers.168  
In this new setting, the key element is the recognition of the target market, for 
which there is no clear definition and only recently some guidelines and five criteria to 
be taken into account for its recognition have been given by the ESMA, which are: 
• The type of clients targeted by the financial products 
• Their level of knowledge and experience 
• Their financial situation 
• Tolerance of the risk and compatibility of the product with the target market 
• Client’s needs and goals.169 
The extension of the obligations to firms that operate as a manufacturer and 
distributor of investment products, in my opinion, creates a more structured 
environment for investor protection, as there is greater transparency over the life of 
the financial products, from their creation to their marketing, which is necessary, 
because the same have become more complex as well as the environment in which 
they are traded. So, the client may have a general oversight of the new situation and 
be more suspicious of the difficult investment decisions he/she is required to take, 
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while the investment firms will make targeted and more effective investment 
proposals to investors. 
2.4. Electronic Trading 
As history has proven, finance is nothing more but a series of innovations, 
which has gradually led to the creation of innovative financial products and processes 
to redistribute wealth and manage risk.170 But it is also true that financial innovation is 
in line with major economic developments, as in the case of algorithmic trading (AT), 
which is an innovative process in which trading strategies should be adapted to the use 
of technology.171 In practice, AT refers to the process in which a computer algorithm is 
used to process orders without or with minimum involvement of the human factor.172 
A special type of AT and the most problematic one is that of HFT which we will see 
below. 
2.4.1. High Frequency Trading 
HFT uses computer algorithms to execute strategic orders while taking 
advantage of specific computer hardware and mathematical models, resulting in 
extremely high speed of trading times.173 Historically, the first algorithmic trading 
samples were back in 1971 when Nasdaq offered an electronic quotation, and by the 
late 1990s most public stock exchanges had provided a fully automated trading 
process.174 At European level, the MiFID I, leaving space for the proliferation of dark 
pools, helped develop automatic execution within the alternative trading venues and 
highlighted the need to regulate markets that came up because of the AT and HFT. The 
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above, combined with the so-called ‘flash crash’ that took place in the American 
financial market on May 2010, put the market participants in suspicion as to how good 
or bad the HFT is.175 The views heard, varied, some were in favor and others against, 
but it is certain that neither side, despite the risks it brought to the financial market, 
did not regard prohibition as a solution, thus, adjusting the market structure to new 
technological risks seemed preferable.176 The willingness to regulate financial 
innovations has increased especially since the outbreak of the financial crisis in mid-
2008.  
About AT and especially HFT, at a European level, MiFID II has decided to allow 
it under strict surveillance rules, due to the intense risk involved.177 New rules for 
automatic trading control have been introduced, which create stringent conditions for 
the operation of algorithms through frequent testing, and circuit breakers that are 
applied when there is widespread trading volatility.178 The MiFID II contains specific 
rules regarding authorization and transparency obligations of investment firms that 
deal with HFT. Indeed, an investment firm that engages in AT and HFT should obtain 
authorization as an investment firm, be subject to supervisory controls and have such 
an internal organization as to ensure the resilience and adequacy of its trading system 
and that it does not send out erroneous orders to execution.179 Subsequently, 
regarding post-trade monitoring, at the request of the relevant competent authority, 
an HFT investment firm may be required to provide all its following strategy 
information, so it should keep a record of all the above information to allow the 
competent supervisory authorities to monitor its compliance with the requirements 
imposed by MiFID II.180 In addition, HFT investment firms acting as market makers 
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should maintain this policy throughout their time action in the trading venue and 
ensure that they meet the internal organizational requirements that allow them to 
comply with the agreement they have concluded with the trading venue. This is 
achieved by considering both the nature and liquidity of the market, but also the 
characteristics of the products being traded.181 Finally, the MiFID II introduces specific 
rules for the trading venues to which the HFT investment firms are connected, to 
ensure the smooth operation of their system and the market’s in general.182  
As we observe, the regulatory framework to be respected is rigorous and 
covers a wide range of factors and operations and that is logical, because only in this 
way can the benefits, such as ‘wider participation in markets, increased liquidity, 
narrower spreads, reduced short term volatility and the means to obtain better 
execution of orders for clients’183 be attributed to the financial market. However, HFT 
also has drawbacks as the investor will have to compete with an algorithm that is 
definitely more effective than traditional human trading, and is accused of creating a 
kind of pseudo-liquidity that quickly disappears due to the increased trading speeds, 
with the result that other investors will not benefit from it.184 But although there are 
risks, the right legislative approach is the only issue for AT and HFT, because already 
today and in the future, the evolution of the trading seems to me that tends to de 
facto use of techniques and strategies such as the HFT. 
2.5. The powers of supervisory authorities 
It is a fact that one of the factors that led to the financial crisis is that of weak 
supervision of the financial sector by the competent authorities.185 With regard to 
ESMA, it is one of the three European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs), which was 
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created following the de Larosiere reforms in 2009 and was assigned the gradual 
regulatory reform of the Securities Markets, within the trend, created after the 
financial crisis, of strengthening central supervisory authorities over national ones and 
of transferring the powers and responsibilities from the Member States to the EU.186 
ESMA aims to ‘enhance investor protection and promote stable and orderly financial 
markets’187, and now is able to take decisions with immediate and binding force.188 
Indeed, the Single Market for Securities cannot be achieved simply by rules, 
unless there are bodies responsible for the unified observance of them and with the 
power to intervene when judged necessary in order to preserve them. Obviously, in 
order to achieve these objectives, cooperation between NCAs and ESMA would be 
necessary, on a case-by-case basis. In particular, the areas that will be of concern to us 
are the supervisory authorities' powers to intervene in the trading of certain financial 
instruments and impose position limits on commodity derivatives. 
2.5.1. The product intervention power granted to NCAs, ESMA and EBA 
Until the revision of the MiFID I, there was no possibility for national regulators 
to intervene by prohibiting or restricting the sale and distribution of specific financial 
instruments and services when this practice had negative effects on the functioning of 
the market, which proved to have affected especially its stability.189 Moreover, there 
was no provision for cooperation between the competent authorities, which would 
facilitate pan-European market surveillance.190 For this reason, rules were introduced 
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which allow both the NCAs and ESMA or EBA191 to intervene. This is the case for the 
first time under the new legislative regime provided for in articles 40 to 43 of MiFIR, 
where under certain conditions, such as when investor protection and systemic 
stability are at risk, the NCAs intervene in the first instance and, when they are inactive 
or their action inadequate, ESMA or EBA take action. The ban or restriction, firstly, is 
the NCAs’ responsibility and must be based on reasonable grounds. Then ESMA or EBA, 
should give its opinion on whether the action was justified and proportionate. The ban 
or restriction should be published on the website of these authorities and last up to 
three months. ESMA and EBA can only temporarily execute this power, but they can 
renew this time frame if they deem it appropriate.  
At this point, some observations are critical. For this action to be effective the 
forces of the national and European authorities should be applied wisely, and 
maximum cooperation should be achieved. An overriding factor is the principle of 
proportionality, a key European principle since the establishment of the EU, which also 
plays a role here in clarifying whether the power to intervene will apply.192 
Furthermore, the product intervention power could be described by some as 
superfluous as they already exist, as we have seen above, the product governance 
requirements.193 However, they cannot guarantee in any case that no harmful 
products will be placed on the market, hence the latter power of intervention, is of 
vital importance to society in general, since, in addition to financial costs, harmful 
products may incur social costs.194 Finally, this direct power granted to ESMA at a 
second phase, is of high importance as it acts as a safeguard to ensure the smooth 
functioning of the market and to avoid future crises such as the one, we have 
experienced recently. 
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2.5.2. Position Limits on commodity derivatives 
The commodity derivatives market was a market characterized by high price 
volatility, which was reinforced by the intense activity in this market of non-
commercial investors.195 At the same time, the increased flow of financial investments 
could not be ascertained and fought due to the lack of transparency of these 
markets.196 Therefore, the lack of information led to inadequate supervisory powers of 
the competent authorities, failing to fulfill their role. That is why this market has been 
the target of the European policy relatively recently, and measures have been taken to 
promote and improve regulation and supervision, transparency and, in general, its 
operation.197 So, it was given the NCAs responsibility to set position limits ‘on the size 
of a net position which a person can hold at all times in commodity derivatives traded 
on trading venues and economically equivalent OTC contracts (EEOTC)’198 according to 
a calculation methodology as determined by the ESMA. Position limits are defined and 
published by NCAs, if ESMA has been consulted and issued its opinion, both of them 
having the obligation to publish these actions on their website. NCAs can adjust or 
even set more stringent limits, in exceptional circumstances, related to liquidity and 
orderly functioning of the market, and for specific time limits. This scheme applies to 
all persons holding a position in a commodity derivative. However, this wide range of 
people it covers, creates many practical issues in identifying a person within, for 
example, a group entity will be more time-consuming.199 At the same time, with regard 
to the EEOTC contracts, although guidelines have been given, it remains difficult for a 
person entering the OTC derivatives to recognize that it is the EEOTC category, if that 
was not his purpose.200 Finally, and for this regime to prosper, it is imperative that 
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members of trading venues, trading venues and investment firms report the positions 
held by them or their clients as provided for in article 58 of MiFID II. 
Assigning this process to the competent authorities is intended to ensure that 
the commodity derivatives market is subject to regulatory oversight, that transparency 
will be enhanced, while speculation that existed until then will be reduced.201 
Moreover, price stability and the strengthening of orderly pricing, avoiding market 
abuse, are also an of great importance goal.202 However, in order to be able to cope 
with this process, investment firms should set up systems for monitoring and 
supervising the position limits held by their clients, and ESMA for its part to allocate 
time and resources to indicate the methodology of setting position limits.203 At the 
same time, ESMA is required to facilitate the work of NCAs, in accordance with article 
44 of MiFIR, but also as a final judge, under article 45 of MiFIR to intervene when 
necessary by exercising the power of position management it holds. However, the 
market, when revising the MiFID I, expressed its doubts as to the imposition of 
position limits, on the main argument, that it would bring legal ambiguity, calling the 
limits on positions ‘arbitrary and misguided’.204 Time will show if these suspicions are 
justified or not. 
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IV. Critical appraisal of the evolution of the legal regime 
Here we will see how the legislative framework has evolved and will present 
some thoughts on its evolution, weaknesses and assets. Up to now, several OTFs have 
already been licensed, and more and more SIs are registered as such.205 Thanks to the 
DVCM suspensions were imposed on many financial instruments and the dark pool 
trading declined.206 However, the flow of trading is channeled to a greater extent to SIs 
and this raises concerns about the structure of the market and the formation of 
competition, as it seems that there is a risk for trading venues, to stay out of the 
game.207 Measures should therefore be taken by ESMA in order to balance the trading 
of securities in these trading services and to eliminate the differences that created this 
inequality. This is one of the biggest thorns of the post-MiFID II/MiFIR era, as it turns 
out that the transition to the lit markets was not a success. Furthermore, it should be 
strongly clarified by all means by ESMA that although SIs are regulated as a venue-like 
regime,208 they cannot create a network between them, similar to multilateral trading 
venues.  
In addition, trading obligation of derivatives has indeed been applied, 
contributing the EU to come closer to achieving the objectives set by the G20 reform 
agenda.209 However, one issue is that until now the EU has been infinite about issues 
of transparency for the derivatives market.210 It should therefore continuously monitor 
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the provisions and their implementation to ensure that equity market problems have 
not spread to the derivatives market and whether this has been done to propose 
changes and corrections and remove misplaced settings. Lastly, the positive aspect is 
that MiFID II/MiFIR, coupled with other legislation, such as the EMIR, has put the 
derivatives market on the path for development, which needs close monitoring and 
supervision, so that one law does not overlap the other.211  
Furthermore, with regard to the increased transparency obligations of almost 
all participants to provide and publish data at each stage of the trading, it is noticeable 
that not all the required information has yet been received by the competent 
authorities,212 while the CTP, which concerns the provision of information to the 
market, although introduced as an idea, has never been created.213 Additionally, the 
increased obligations of investment firms to archive, report and publish information, in 
order to fulfill their best execution obligation, has created anxiety on how they will 
take advantage of all the possibilities offered by MiFID II.214 Thus, it should be noted 
that the creation of a single CTP by ESMA itself is already under discussion. The 
positive thing with this, in my opinion, is that ESMA will contribute to the finding of the 
appropriate CTP model and will ensure that this will actually work in the interest of the 
final recipients. However, under this case, I believe that the relevant provisions will 
have to be revised, because the relationship and involvement that ESMA will now have 
with the CTP should also be regulated. Additionally, at least for the time being, NCAs 
should provide more guidance on the information that companies have to provide, 
especially those smaller in size, which so far have perhaps not even had such an 
internal organization and a department dedicated to the collection and processing of 
this information. In any case, I believe that all participants should keep in mind that the 
real purpose of the legislation is that transparency must be increased because it serves 
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the price formation process. This means that it is not intended to provide full 
transparency, but only as much needed to achieve the above intended result. This will 
help them set priorities and better manage the volume of data, with the result of their 
smooth operation and the facilitation of supervisory authorities’ work.  
As regards the process of providing services, product creation and distribution, 
it should be reformed taking into account sustainability issues so that the MiFID 
II/MiFIR provisions are in line with the Action Plan on sustainable finance adopted by 
the EC.215 The organizational requirements of investment firms should therefore be 
shaped and adapted to sustainability risks, product governance regime should also 
consider sustainable factors, and investment firms should propose appropriate 
investments to meet all the needs of the investors, even those who support 
sustainable development and are looking for matching investments. I see a new era, 
with a look at sustainable investment and an attempt to change the investment culture 
so far.  
But, what about the ban of inducements? Will investment firms be reconciled 
with this ban? Will they change the provision of their services so that they are not 
covered by the ban? Will they find the way to fill this gap by increasing the cost of 
providing their services to customers? Surely the last choice is probably the most 
unlikely; as it will deter investors and strengthen the market position of firms which 
themselves bear the burden of the prohibition. This is probably the most obscure and 
controversial point so far in this legislation, but these provisions are legitimate, in my 
opinion, to complement the investor's overall spirit of protection. 
Finally, electronic trading seems to be gaining ground and serving issues 
relating to the compliance of investment firms and trading venues with increased data 
retention, reporting and publishing requirements, as the concept of electronic trading 
implies the automatic storage of information in algorithms, which can be retrieved and 
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searched by the competent authorities if they so request.216 I consider the familiarity 
with electronic trading and HFT particularly important, as it offers room for developing 
new practices and collaborations with innovative companies that can transfer their 
technological knowledge to both the market and the supervisory authorities. 
 Finally, good cooperation between NCAs and ESMA is, in my view, even more 
significant than the powers given to them. Every authority can impose the power it is 
given, but whether it is really needed and to what extent, is of greater importance. In 
order to ascertain this, each Member State should ensure and facilitate continuous 
communication, cooperation and exchange of information between NCAs and ESMA, 
so that any power is enforced fairly and proportionately.  
To conclude, I find that the market in general adapted relatively easily and 
smoothly and managed to do so without losing its power. Market participants have to 
work constantly to meet their obligations in order to keep the quality of the market 
high. It is a massive, highly technical and difficult to understand legislation, so it will 
take time and practice to get used to it. At the same time, ESMA should have a 
supportive role and constantly give guidance, using to the utmost all powers given to 
it, especially when it sees that the true meaning of the provisions is being distorted. It's 
too early to talk about MiFID III, as we have not yet seen the full impact of the current 
regime. My concern, however, is that from an era of totally laid back regulation we 
have suddenly jumped to an extreme regulatory period, so intrusive, that instead of 
facilitating the operation of the market, perhaps it makes it even harder. It is a game of 
balance, which in my opinion is due to an extreme overregulation spree which has 
reached its libido and in which we will soon find out who will be the winner. In my 
opinion there is no need for more of the same tactics which just result in a recycling of 
the same vicious circle.  
 
                                                 
216 Joshua Warner, Why has high-frequency trading decreased? (IG Community, 10 October 2018) Available at 
<https://www.ig.com/au/trading-opportunities/why-has-high-frequency-trading-decreased--181010>, accessed 8 
February 2019 
  -49- 
V. Conclusions 
Since its creation, the EU has been aiming to create a Single Market, seeking its 
integration. For this reason, it accompanied its political decisions with laws that would 
support cross-border activity, facilitating the transfer of capital and services across 
Europe, regulating the relationship between investment firms and investors, the 
transaction of financial instruments, the places where this occurs and the obligations 
of market participants, with the sole aim of full investor protection, market 
transparency and stability. Key milestones were the post-FSAP and post-financial crisis 
eras, which were highly regulatory and helped to redefine the market and its needs. 
MiFID I was the first complete legislative instrument and laid solid foundations to 
achieve the above goals, changing the market as we knew it. MiFID II/MiFIR, even 
more interventionist, have come to fill gaps and set stricter rules to rebuild the 
vulnerable from the crisis market. In any case, what must always be reminded of, 
regarding the crisis is that market dynamics are a continuous and uninterrupted 
process.217 And in my opinion, these dynamics will never reach a level that will bring 
about the desired integration, because of the nature of man and society, which always 
seeks something more and that is reflected in everything around us. 
To sum up, we saw shares trading returning to organized markets, non-equity 
instruments are now traded on the OTF, and SMEs find ways to escape financial 
difficulties thanks to capital funding. OTC activity is being reduced and competition is 
sought on a level playing field for all trading venues. Furthermore, obligations for pre- 
and post-trade transparency are imposed on all financial instruments, and data 
collection requirements in a place, where investors and competent authorities will 
have access, drawing information, so that the former can make more profitable 
investments and the latter oversee the implementation of the rules.  
In addition, the investor and his protection remain at the heart of the 
legislation. Stricter ‘conduct of business’ requirements are imposed on investment 
firms, investment advice is divided into independent and non-independent and ban 
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inducements are imposed on them and on the portfolio management to avoid conflicts 
of interest. Investment firms that manufacture and distribute financial products are 
also under probe and are subject to increased organizational requirements and 
investor information requirements.  
MiFID II/MiFIR undertook also the task to adapt the market to technological 
breakthroughs by imposing controls on transactions completed through algorithms, 
wanting to anticipate developments and address the risk they pose. Finally, the 
supervisory powers of NCAs and ESMA, which can now intervene in the marketing and 
trading of financial products to protect investors and market stability, and to supervise 
the commodity derivatives market more closely to prevent speculation, are 
strengthened.  
Stressing, therefore, that, in order for the legislative regime we have developed 
above, to be successful, it must satisfy a set of traditional aims pursued by the law, i.e. 
supporting and promoting market stability, integrity and transparency, high efficiency 
and fair functioning, and of course the investors’ protection at both a national and a 
European level.218 With all looks focused on this, there will have to be a constant 
struggle to eliminate the divergence between the rules, which as long as it exists is a 
barrier that prevents the construction and harmonious accomplishment of the Single 
Financial Market. 
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